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Abstract
The ability to identify similarities between narratives has been argued to be central in human
interactions. Previous work that sought to formalize this task has hypothesized that narrative
similarity can be equated to the existence of a common summary between the narratives involved.
We offer tangible psychological evidence in support of this hypothesis. Human participants in our
empirical study were presented with triples of stories, and were asked to rate: (i) the degree of
similarity between story A and story B; (ii) the appropriateness of story C as a summary of story
A; (iii) the appropriateness of story C as a summary of story B. The story triples were selected
systematically to span the space of their possible interrelations. Empirical evidence gathered
from this study overwhelmingly supports the position that the higher the latter two ratings are,
the higher the first rating also is. Thus, while this work does not purport to formally define
either of the two tasks involved, it does argue that one can be meaningfully reduced to the other.
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1 Introduction
Stories play a central role in human knowledge, understanding and reasoning, and are key in
explaining human behavior and social communication [1, 24].
According to Schank and Abelson [24], human knowledge is functional, in the sense
that all knowledge is encoded as stories along with mechanisms to construct, store and
retrieve them. Hence, human memory is a collection of stories that we experienced, heard
or composed in the past. Searching in memory is like searching for stories within one’s
own collection of stories. Moreover, existing stories in memory form our beliefs and are the
ingredients of new ideas.
Following that view, understanding and behavior depends upon our past experiences,
stored as old stories. In order to understand a new story, we have to find an old story that is
similar to the new one. Thus, understanding, for a listener, means mapping the speaker’s
stories onto the listener’s stories. This is why different people may interpret the same story in
different ways. Analogously, when we face a new unfamiliar situation, we have to determine
which of the old situations — stored as stories — in our memory is most relevant to the
situation at hand. The familiar situation that is most similar to the new one determines our
behavior in the new situation. As a result, intelligent behavior lies upon our capability of
finding a relevant past experience that will help us make sense of a new experience [24].
But how does one determine the extent to which stories are considered to be similar?
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1.1 Similarity: Existing Approaches
Similarity is a very powerful construct in psychology, entering into the analysis of many
diverse phenomena, such as creative and scientific discovery, problem-solving, categorization,
decision-making, learning and transfer [10, 27]. In this section we briefly describe several
approaches to similarity as proposed in the literature.
i) The geometric approach determines similarity using the mental distance models
(see, e.g., [20, 25, 26]). According to that view, concepts are represented as points within a
multi-dimensional mental space and similarity between concepts as the inverse of the metric
distance between these points. Thus, the less the distance between the point representations
of two concepts A and B, the more similar the concepts are. As the distance between two
points A and B within the space increases, it becomes easier for us to detect that the concepts
A and B are different.
The geometric approach treats similarity as a symmetric relation, in the sense that the
similarity of A to B equals the similarity of B to A. However, Tversky [27] argued against
the symmetry assumption, providing empirical evidence for asymmetric similarities, and
proposed his own model for similarity.
ii) The featural approach, represented by Tversky’s classic contrast model [27], proposes
that concepts are represented as selections of features, and similarity is described as a feature-
matching process. Specifically, the similarity between two concepts is computed based on
numbers of shared and not shared features (expressed as a linear combination of the measures
of their common and distinct features). The greater the size of the set of the common features
of two concepts A and B, and the smaller the sizes of the two sets of distinct features A \B
and B \A, the greater the similarity between the two concepts A and B. This model also
accounts for the asymmetry assumption of similarity, since the negative effects of the two
complement sets A \B and B \A are not equal. Hence, if we ask how similar A is to B, then
the set B \A counts much more than the set A \B.
Later on, Gentner [7] indicated that although Tversky’s contrast model seemed to be
correct for literal similarity comparisons, it did not provide a good account for other types
of comparisons, such as analogies. Hence, Gentner [7] introduced the following approach,
providing a theoretical framework for analogy.
iii) The structural (or relational) approach is based on Gentner’s work on Structure
Mapping Theory (SMT) [7, 8, 10]. Two concepts, that function as wholes, may be treated
as analogous when they share some essential relations, even if they may have a lot of
distinct features. Because of this singularity of analogy, structure-mapping, in contrast to
the featural approach, treats commonalities and differences as dependent features. Concepts
are considered as structures of object attributes and relations, and comparisons are made by
mapping the structures of the two concepts. The main idea of this theory is that analogy
is characterized by mapping relations between objects, rather than merely mapping the
attributes of the objects. Thus, comparisons rely only on the syntax of the knowledge
representations and not on their specific content. Furthermore, the structural approach
allows analogies to be distinguished clearly from literal similarity and other kinds of concept
comparisons, as we shall discuss in more detail in Section 2.2.
iv) A more recent approach, the tansformational approach [11, 12] considers concepts
as representations, and suggests that similarity depends on the ease of transformation
between these representations. Specifically, the less the number of steps needed to transform
a representation into another representation, the higher the similarity between the two
concepts is. Thus, the more dissimilar the entities, the more transformations are needed.
Hahn et al. empirically tested the view of similarity as transformational distance [11, 12],
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and proposed the Representational Distortion as a specific example of this approach [11].
However, Larkey and Markman, while testing the similarity judgments for geometric objects,
found some evidence against this approach [14].
1.2 Computational Modelling of Narratives
Previous attempts to create computational models of narratives include Propp’s narrative
functions (or narratemes) [21], Rumelhart’s Story Grammars [22], Lehnert’s Plot Units
[15, 16], Löwe’s Doxastic Preference Framework (DPF) [17], Elson’s Story Intention Graphs
(SIG) [4] and Chambers’ Narrative Event Chains (NEC) [2]. Moreover, several recent
computational studies provided algorithms that manage to make story comparisons [5, 13]
and recognize narrative similarity [18] and analogy [3].
The current study attempts to define similarity of narratives by means of the concept of
summary. To this end, it has been conjectured [18, 19] that similarity between two stories
is effectively equivalent to saying that the two stories have a common summary; i.e., an
abstraction that is appropriate for both stories. In particular, the more appropriate this
common summary is for the two stories, the more similar the two stories are. This statement
forms the main hypothesis that we seek to empirically examine in this work.
2 Background
Our investigation of the above hypothesis does not presuppose any particular framework of
story understanding, nor any particular approach to defining similarity. Nonetheless, we find
it useful to adopt certain notions and terminology from the SMT [7, 8] and to compare some
of our obtained results to those obtained under the SMT. We shall, thus, present the SMT
in more detail in this section.
2.1 Structure Mapping Theory for Analogy
When we interpret analogies such as “A is like B”, we draw inferences about a concept A
(target), based on our knowledge of another concept B (base), which serves as the source of
our knowledge. The central idea of the SMT [7, 8] is the definition of the analogy as “an
assertion that a relational structure that normally applies in one concept can be applied in
another concept” [7]. Thus, the essence of an analogy between two concepts A and B is that
they share a common structure. This structure is the dominant aspect of concepts A and
B, even though these concepts may differ in many other aspects. For example, we might
say that a child’s mind is like a sponge. One could easily interpret this analogy, drawing
the inference that a child’s mind absorbs a lot of information. Hence, we use our knowledge
about sponges in order to draw inferences about a child’s mind. However, we do not transfer
all our knowledge about sponges to the child’s mind. If we did so, then we could argue
that the child’s mind is yellow with holes and holds water. But we do not! Although the
child’s mind and the sponge do not share other common features, this does not seem to
count against the analogy. This is why Gentner criticized Tversky’s contrast model [27] as
not appropriate for analogies [7].
Continuing with the sponge-mind example, it seems that people, seeking to identify
analogies, somehow know which features must be transferred and which not. The SMT
is capable to explain such behavior, by suggesting that i) we tend to focus on relational
information and ignore the distinctive attributes of objects in A and B ii) we prefer to focus
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Table 1 Similarity types according to Gentner’s work [7, 8, 9].
Object Relational Predicates
Similarity type Attributes Low-order Higher-order
Literal Similarity (LS) X X X
Analogy (ANA) × X X
Surface Similarity (SS) or Mere Appearance X X ×
First Order Relations (FOR) × X ×
Objects Only (OO) X × ×
Anomaly (ANO) × × ×
on interconnected systems of relations and favor these relations in our interpretations (see
the mapping principles as described later in this section).
According to the structural approach, knowledge is represented as a propositional network
of nodes and predicates [7, 23]. Nodes represent concepts, while predicates express proposi-
tions about these concepts. Predicates may be either object attributes, taking one argument
(e.g., YELLOW(x)), or relationships, taking two or more arguments (e.g., SMALLER(x, y)).
A further syntactic distinction of predicates is also made: first-order predicates take ob-
jects as arguments (e.g., HURT(y, x) and HATE(x, y)), while higher-order predicates take
propositions as arguments (e.g., CAUSE[HURT(y, x),HATE(x, y)]) [7].
Using these notions, we briefly introduce the two main mapping principles of the SMT:
i) relations, rather than object attributes, are mapped from the base to the target concept,
and ii) a relation that belongs to a system of mutually interconnected relations is more likely
to be mapped than an isolate relation (known as the Systematicity Principle) [7].
2.2 Similarity Types
The SMT clearly distinguishes analogy from other kinds of concept comparisons. Table
1 summarizes several similarity types, proposed by Gentner et al. [7, 8, 9], based on the
possible combinations of the predicates that two concepts may share.
To apply Gentner’s work to story comparisons, Gentner, Rattermann and Forbus [9]
considered i) object attributes as the characters, objects and locations of the story, ii) first-
order relations as the events, actions and other relations between the objects of the story
(e.g., X talking to Y), and iii) the higher-order relational structure as the causal (or other
types of) relations in the story’s plot. According to these assumptions, they created pairs of
stories by generating several versions of a base story, which differed in the level of similarity
they shared with the original story.
In the present study we borrow the names of the similarity types proposed by Gentner
(Table 1). However, while applying these types into story pairs, we interpret predicates in a
slightly different manner than Gentner et al. [9] did (see Section 3.2.2).
3 Empirical Method
In order to test our main hypothesis that story similarity relates to the existence of a common
summary, we designed an online questionnaire and we invited people to rate pairs of stories
in terms of their similarity or in terms of how appropriate a third story was as a summary of
each of the first two stories.
E. Kypridemou and L. Michael 133
3.1 Participants
Individuals were invited via e-mail to participate voluntarily to the study, by completing
an online questionnaire. No financial or other compensation was given for participation.
Although more than a hundred people started completing the questionnaire, participants
who left before answering at least one question of the main part of the experiment were
excluded from our sample. Hence, the final sample of our study comprised 52 adults (21
male, 31 female), aged 18 to 65 years (one reported age 66+). Participants were mainly
residents of Greece (26) and Cyprus (22) and they all spoke Greek as their native language.
3.2 Measures
Before proceeding to the detailed description of the various stages of the questionnaire
construction, we give a brief overview of the procedure followed, and we introduce the
notation that we will use. To prevent any later confusion, we find it useful to discriminate
early between the groups of stories initially constructed, the trials of the questionnaire,
and the triples of stories used during the analysis stage.
First, we created a pool of selected narratives, serving as the source for our stories
(Section 3.2.1). We then edited some of these stories in order to form pairs (A,B) of stories
S ∈ {A,B} with varying degrees of similarity (Section 3.2.2). For each story pair (A,B) we
also generated 4 other stories Ci,j ∈ {C11, C10, C01, C00}, which we considered as summaries
of stories A and B (Section 3.2.3). As a result, during the story preparation stage, we formed
16 groups comprising 6 stories each (A,B,C11,C10,C01, C00). These groups of stories served
as a source for the 16 trials of the questionnaire (Section 3.2.4), where each trial comprised
4 stories (A,B,C11, along with one of C10,C01,C00) selected from its corresponding group.
Later on, in order to test our main hypothesis (Section 4.2), for each trial of the questionnaire
we formed two triples (A,B,Ci,j), one with Ci,j = C11 and one with Ci,j ∈ {C10, C01, C00},
resulting in a total of 32 triples for each participant who fully completed the questionnaire.
For participants who completed the questionnaire only partially, we gathered as many triples
as possible given the participants’ responses.
3.2.1 Selection of a Pool of Original Stories
Since we wanted the stories of the experiment to be as naturalistic as possible and not to
appear like artificial stories made especially for use in the lab, we decided to mainly use
existing stories, rather than to produce our own. In order to find such original stories, we
searched for literature books and collections of myths and fairy tales in the library. We also
searched for online videos and texts of narrations, and we recorded oral narrations.
During the selection of the original stories, we mainly took into account two factors: i)
the reputation of the story, and ii) the content of the story. Regarding the first factor, to
ensure that the participants’ previous knowledge of the stories would not bias their responses,
we avoided using well-known stories (e.g., the French novella “The little prince” of Antoine
de Saint-Exupéry). Concerning the second factor, we gave preference to stories with didactic
or entertaining content, which we considered as interesting enough for the participants to
read. Having in mind the fact that participation to the questionnaire was a voluntary and
time consuming process, such a restriction of the space of different story types was necessary
to motivate people to fill in the questionnaire and also to prevent them from leaving the
process early. Hence, we avoided stories that merely described a sequence of events without
any further purport, and favored those where the author’s intention was to pass a deeper
message, or even entertain the reader, through the narration. Given these constraints, we
CMN 2013
134 Narrative Similarity as Common Summary
created a pool of dozens of original stories, or excerpts of them, both worth reading and not
well known.
3.2.2 Generation of Story Pairs According to Similarity Types
Following the story selection, we edited the original stories by adjusting their length. Edited
stories were (i) not too long for the participants to read, but also (ii) long enough, in order
to keep the style of the original version and not to appear artificial.
We then created story pairs (A,B) with varying degrees of similarity, inspired by the
similarity types used in previous work [7, 8, 9] based on the SMT. However, since our aim
was to cover the entire range of similarity degrees between stories A and B, rather than
to contrast the several similarity types proposed in the literature, we only used Literal
Similarity (LS), Analogy (ANA), Surface Similarity (SS) and Anomaly (ANO). Consequently,
we defined the variable sim-type(A,B), taking values in {LS,ANA,SS,ANO}, to indicate
the similarity degree assumed by the experimenters for each story pair (A,B).
To create story pairs of the above types of similarity, we interpreted the SMT’s predicates
(cf. Table 1) as follows: i) object attributes served as the characters of the stories, ii) first-order
relations served as relations between the characters, which could either state a relationship
(e.g., X neighbor of Y) or an emotional relation (e.g., X loves Y), while iii) higher-order
relations served as the overall structure of the plot, in which the relationships and the main
interactions between the characters and their actions are represented as an interconnected
system (e.g., X lies to Y repeatedly; someday X really needs Y’s help; Y do not believe X’s
need; Y leave X helpless; great disaster happens to X).
Given the above interpretations, we created 4 pairs of stories (A,B) for each of the 4
similarity types, resulting in a total of 16 pairs. To do so we chose a story A from the pool
of our selected original stories and we paired it with another story B, which was either
generated by the experimenters or, preferably, also extracted from the pool, so as to match
the constraints of each similarity type.
Story pairs of the LS type comprised two versions of practically the same story. Hence,
we produced story B by expressing story A using different wording, and changing one or
two minor details having little or no importance for the overall meaning of the story (e.g.,
iron wheel vs. stone wheel, for a story where the wheel weight was essential, rather than its
material).
Pairs belonging to the ANA type were stories with different characters, where the same
basic relations held between them. In the most dissimilar cases of ANA pairs, the overall
structures of the two stories differed in some isolated relations, but never in the most
interconnected ones.
For example, the structure described earlier (X lies to Y repeatedly; someday X really
needs Y’s help; Y do not believe X’s need; Y leave X helpless; great disaster happens to
X) was a common structure of an ANA pair. For story A, X was a shepherd and Y were
his fellow villagers, while for story B, X was a grandmother and Y were her children and
grandchildren. Some other elements which differed between the stories were: the lie itself, the
outcome of lying, the real need of X, and the disaster that happened to X. For example, in
story A, the lie was that a wolf attacks the sheep, the outcome was to laugh at the villagers
who went to help, the need appeared when a wolf really attacked the sheep, and the disaster
was the loss of the sheep. In story B, the lie was that the old woman pretends to be very
sick, the outcome was to gain her family’s company by ‘forcing’ them to visit her, the need
was when the old woman was really feeling sick, and the disaster was the woman’s death.
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Table 2 Guidelines used for the construction of the story pairs (A,B) and their summaries Ci,j
for each similarity type sim-type(A,B) ∈ {LS,ANA,SS,ANO}.
(A,B) C11 C10 (resp., C01) C00
LS Same stories with
few minor details
differing.
Specific non-shared
detail(s) of A and B
missing.
C11 plus the de-
tail(s) of story A
(resp., B).
C11 with a key ele-
ment of the plot
changed or missing.
ANA Stories share a
common struc-
ture of their plot
except for some
isolated rela-
tions. Different
characters.
The common
structure of A and
B. Characters
expressed in an
abstract way com-
patible with both A
and B.
C11 plus one of
the missing isolated
relations specified
only in A (resp., B).
C11 with a key ele-
ment of the plot miss-
ing or replaced to
be incompatible with
both A and B.
SS Identical stories
up to one point.
Different endings.
A summary of the
common part of A
and B. Ending is
missing.
C11 plus a summary
of the ending of
story A (resp., B).
C11 plus an ending
different than both
A’s and B’s.
ANO Different stories
with a common
extremely ab-
stract structure.
The common ab-
stract structure of A
and B.
C11 plus one of the
abstract elements
specified in A (resp.,
B).
C11 with one of the
elements changed to
be incompatible with
both A and B.
In order to create story B for the ANA pairs, we searched for stories in the pool and, if
we could not find any appropriate story, we generated our own B.
For the SS story pairs, we chose a story A and we generated a story B, identical to A
up to some point, but with a completely different ending. The ending was edited in a way
that was crucial for the overall meaning of the story (e.g., at the end the king admired and
appointed the hero as his main advisor vs. the king disapproved the hero’s behavior and
banished him: the choice characterizes the whole behavior of the hero as good vs. bad).
Finally, the stories of the ANO pairs were completely different stories that shared some
common structure. This common structure was extremely abstract, so that it missed most
of the key elements for understanding the overall meaning of the stories (e.g., an older man
who lies reveals a secret to a younger man). Concrete characters and relations between
the characters (e.g., the secret, the reason the man lies, the reason the young man asks for
the secret, and the relation of the two men) differed between the two stories. Similarly to
ANA types, we generated our own stories B for the ANO pairs when we could not find any
appropriate story B in the pool.
Overall, 20 out of 32 stories of the questionnaire came from the pool of selected original
stories (16 as story A, 4 as story B). The remaining B stories were either edited versions
of the corresponding original stories A (for the LS and SS types), or stories generated by
the experimenters to meet the specific criteria of the ANA and ANO similarity types. Most
of the original stories used (14 out of 20) were found in books already translated in Greek,
with 6 of them being fairy tales and myths from all over the world (Japan, China, Arabia,
Lithuania, Burma, Hungary). Among the remaining original stories, 3 came from online
texts, 2 from online videos, and 1 from oral narration.
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3.2.3 Generation of Summaries According to Summary Types
For each of the 16 story pairs (A,B) we created 4 different summaries Ci,j ∈ {C11, C10, C01,
C00}, and for each triple (A,B,Ci,j ,) we defined the variable sum-type(Ci,j , S), to indicate
the appropriateness of summary Ci,j for story S ∈ {A,B}. Our intention here was to cover
the range of possible summaries in a semi-systematic manner. Thus, we created i) a ‘common’
summary C11, with the aim of being an appropriate summary for both the stories A and B,
ii) a summary C10, with the aim of being appropriate for story A and inappropriate for story
B, iii) a summary C01, with the aim of being inappropriate for story A and appropriate for
story B, and finally, iv) a summary C00, with the aim of being inappropriate for both the
stories A and B.
Given the above definition of Ci,j , the variable sum-type(Ci,j , A), indicating the appropri-
ateness of summary Ci,j for story A, had the value ‘good’ if i = 1, and the value ‘bad’ if i = 0.
Accordingly, the variable sum-type(Ci,j , B), indicating the appropriateness of summary Ci,j
for story B, had the value ‘good’ if j = 1, and the value ‘bad’ if j = 0. Hence, i can be seen
as an index of the appropriateness of summary Ci,j for story A, and j as an index of its
appropriateness for story B. In general, the variable sum-type(Ci,j , S) had the value ‘good’
if either (S = A and i = 1) or (S = B and j = 1), and the value ‘bad’ otherwise.
We considered a summary Ci,j as inappropriate, when some essential feature of the story
S was either missing or changed in the summary. However, appropriate summaries could
include an unimportant detail of a story as well. Thus, we did not consider the succinctness
of the summary as a defining characteristic of the appropriateness of the summary. Table 2
describes the methodology we adopted in order to create the 4 summaries Ci,j , for each of
the 4 similarity types. C11 served as a baseline for creating the other 3 summaries. For C10
and C01 we modified C11 so as to be slightly more appropriate than C11 for one of the two
stories and slightly less appropriate for the other story, while for C00 we modified C11 so as
to be slightly less appropriate than C11 for both A and B. Our concern was to avoid creating
summaries that would be obviously inappropriate for one of the two stories. This choice
was guided by the fact that our main hypothesis states that the existence of an appropriate
common summary indicates a high similarity pair. Consequently, low values of summary
scores would be less useful in validating or falsifying this hypothesis during our analysis.
3.2.4 Questionnaire Construction
Each trial of the questionnaire included the presentation of 4 stories (A, B, their common
summary C11, and one of the non-common summaries), along with 5 questions, asking
participants to rate the similarity between stories A and B, and the appropriateness of the
other two stories as summaries for each of the stories A and B.
In the place of the non-common summary we chose C00 to appear in half of the cases,
and C10 and C01 to appear in one fourth of the cases each. To achieve these frequencies,
we created quadruples (C10, C01, C00, C00) and we used the Latin Squares method to
counterbalance their order. We created 4 conditions (Table 3) and we randomly allocated
participants to each of these conditions (see Section 3.3). As a result, for each of the 4
similarity types, in addition to the common summary C11, each participant was presented
with each of summaries C10 and C01 once, and with summary C00 twice. Moreover, the
order of the 16 trials of the questionnaire, as well as the order of the two summaries of each
trial, was randomized.
Using the open source survey application LimeSurvey 2.00+, we implemented the above
methods by constructing an online questionnaire, which we describe in more detail next.
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Table 3 Summaries presented across the four Conditions (in addition to C11, which was presented
in each Condition).
Similarity Condition
Trial type 1 2 3 4
1 LS C10 C01 C00 C00
2 LS C01 C00 C00 C10
3 LS C00 C00 C10 C01
4 LS C00 C10 C01 C00
5 ANA C10 C01 C00 C00
6 ANA C01 C00 C00 C10
7 ANA C00 C00 C10 C01
8 ANA C00 C10 C01 C00
Similarity Condition
Trial type 1 2 3 4
9 SS C10 C01 C00 C00
10 SS C01 C00 C00 C10
11 SS C00 C00 C10 C01
12 SS C00 C10 C01 C00
13 ANO C10 C01 C00 C00
14 ANO C01 C00 C00 C10
15 ANO C00 C00 C10 C01
16 ANO C00 C10 C01 C00
3.3 Procedure
An e-mail was sent to a number of people, inviting them to complete the questionnaire and
to further disseminate the invitation. In order to encourage participation, in the invitation
e-mail we informed the recipients that during completion of our on-line questionnaire they
were going to read interesting stories and myths from all over the world. They were also
informed that the study concerns the similarity of narratives and summarization, but they
were given no further information on the specific hypothesis of our study.
Participants who entered the questionnaire were assured that responses were collected
anonymously. After certifying that they are adults and native Greek speakers, they were
given navigation instructions, and they were instructed how to safely interrupt the process
in case they would wish to continue later. Afterwards, they provided information on their
demographic characteristics (gender, age, educational level, country of residence) and they
reported whether they enjoy reading stories, myths, fairy tales and literature, and how often
they read such texts.
The practice section followed, where an example of a trial was given in order to clarify
the process. Participants were told that they are going to read two stories, A and B, and
rate their similarity in a scale from 0 (no similarity) to 5 (high similarity). For illustrative
purposes, the stories A and B used in the example were considerably shorter than the stories
of the experiment. Some help was given, where we stated explicitly the differences between
the two stories and asked participants whether they consider these differences (along with
others that they may have identified) as significant enough so as to rate the two stories with a
low degree of similarity, or they consider the differences meaningless for the general meaning
of the stories, and so they would rate the two stories with a high score. After registering
their responses, we informed them that two more stories would appear on the screen in order
to evaluate how good they consider each of the new stories as a summary for each of the
stories A and B, in a scale from 0 (very bad summary) to 5 (very good summary). The
stories A and B, along with two example summaries were presented. As previously, some
help was provided, stating that some statements of the original stories are missing in the
summaries, and asking participants to evaluate whether they consider these statements as
important enough so as to rate the summary as bad, or not. Finally, participants were given
the chance to read the instructions once more, in case the did not feel confident with the
process. At no point in this practice section did we suggest what an appropriate score would
be for the example questions.
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Following the practice section, a screen with some guidelines appeared. Participants were
first encouraged to answer according to their own judgment, since there are no “right” or
“wrong” answers. They were then advised to rate summaries by considering which facts of the
stories A and B are included and which are missing, and ignore possible syntactic or stylistic
aspects of the stories. We also asked participants to be as consistent as possible in their
ratings during the whole experiment. Finally we advised them not to judge a summary solely
by its length, since length does not necessarily indicate a summary’s appropriateness. After
reading these guidelines, we asked them to make sure that they are in a quiet environment,
since the main part of the experiment was about to start.
At the beginning of the main part of the experiment, each participant was randomly
allocated to one of the four conditions of the experiment. Then, the first randomly selected
trial started. Participants were blind to the labeling of the story pairs (A,B) according to
the 4 similarity types, and the labeling of the summaries Ci,j according to the 4 summary
types. Hence, they could only see 4 stories presented on the screen, without having any
cue about the experimenters’ assumptions (i.e., sim-type(A,B) and sum-type(Ci,j , S)). The
first pair of stories (A,B) appeared and participants were asked to rate their similarity on a
scale from 0 (no similarity) to 5 (high similarity). After registering their score, which was
recorded as sim-score(A,B), two summaries appeared on the screen in random order: the
common summary C11, along with one of the summaries C10, C01, C00, according to the trial
and the participant’s condition (Table 3). Participants were asked to judge how good they
considered each of the two summaries for each of the stories A and B, on a scale from 0 (very
bad summary) to 5 (very good summary). These ratings were recorded as sum-score(Ci,j , A)
and sum-score(Ci,j , B) respectively. As a result, for each trial we recorded 1 similarity score
and 4 summary scores. After completing the first trial the participants proceeded to the
next one and continued scoring as previously, until all 16 trials were completed. Finally,
participants were thanked and were invited to leave comments about the survey.
4 Empirical Results
Although only 28 out of 52 participants fully completed the questionnaire, we decided to keep
incomplete responses in our analysis, since the experimental design allowed us to do so (the
trials of the questionnaire were randomly ordered and independent of one another). For those
who fully completed the questionnaire the whole procedure lasted on average 87 minutes.
The long duration indicates that participants spent enough time to read the instructions
and that they read the stories carefully before they gave their scorings. Table 4 displays the
demographic characteristics of our sample. The fact that most of the participants reported
that they like reading stories and they do so frequently (see Table 4), indicates that our
sample had the appropriate skills and experience for completing the task of our study.
Regarding our experimental design, our data suggests that participants were well distrib-
uted over the 4 conditions (12 in the first, 10 in the second, 16 in the third and 14 in the
fourth condition). The Latin Squares method also worked efficiently since, in addition to
the common summary C11 which was presented in all 551 trials, the second summary was
chosen 25% (137/551) of the times to be summary C10, another 25% (137/551) of the times
to be summary C01, and 50% (277/551) of the times to be summary C00 (see ‘Overall’ row,
Table 5).
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Table 4 Number of Participants (NOP) for each Age Range, Educational Level, Preference and
Frequency of Reading Stories.
Age Educational Level Reading Stories
Range NOP Degree NOP Like Do not Like
18–20 2 High School 7 Never 0 1
21–30 19 Bachelor’s 24 Rarely 5 6
31–40 9 Master’s 6 Sometimes 14 0
41–50 6 Ph.D. 15 Often 20 0
51–60 10 Always 6 0
>60 6
4.1 Participant Scores Compared to Experiment Type
As a preliminary analysis to validate our experimental setting, we investigated whether the
types of similarity and summaries that we had considered, indeed matched the scores given
by participants. Participant similarity (sim-score(A,B)) and summary (sum-score(Ci,j , S))
scores confirmed the experimenters’ assumptions regarding the similarity (sim-type(A,B))
and summary (sum-type(Ci,j , S)) types, respectively. The similarity scores sim-score(A,B)
not only matched the similarity level assumed for each similarity type sim-type(A,B), but
also, considering the error bars of Figure 1 (Left), clearly differentiated the LS and ANA
(average similarity scores 4.64 and 3.44, respectively) from the SS and ANO types (average
similarity scores 2.07 and 1.64, respectively).
Moreover, the 4 summary types sum-type(Ci,j , S) were also confirmed by the summary
scores sum-score(Ci,j , A) and sum-score(Ci,j , B) given by the participants for the appropri-
ateness of summary Ci,j for stories A and B, respectively (Figure 1, Right). Participants
judged the common summary C11 as appropriate for both stories A and B. They also
judged summary C10 as more appropriate for story A than for B, and summary C01 as more
appropriate for story B than for A. Finally, they judged summary C00 with a relatively low
degree of appropriateness for both stories A and B (Figure 1, Right; Table 5, ‘Overall’).
Table 5 shows how the average summary scores sum-score(Ci,j , S) are distributed across the
4 similarity types. It is noteworthy that in the case of the SS and ANO similarity types, scores
given to the common summary C11 were considerably lower than the sum-score(C10, A) and
sum-score(C01, B) scores, which is in accordance with our main hypothesis (see Section 5
for a discussion).
4.2 Testing our Main Hypothesis
Figure 2 already provides a first indication in support of our hypothesis, showing that pairs
of stories that were of types sim-type(A,B) that are considered more similar, were also
associated with a better common summary C11, as measured by the participants’ average
summary score sum-score(Ci,j , S).
For the main part of our analysis, we ignored the labels given to the similarity and summary
types by the experimenters, and we analyzed the relations between the triples of scores given
by the participants for each triple of stories (A,B,Ci,j): i) the appropriateness of summary
Ci,j for story A (sum-score(Ci,j , A)), ii) the appropriateness of summary Ci,j for story
B (sum-score(Ci,j , B)), and iii) the similarity between stories A and B (sim-score(A,B)).
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Figure 1 Participants’ scorings matching the experimenters’ labeling. Left: Average similarity
scores sim-score(A,B) given for each similarity type sim-type(A,B). Right: Average summary
scores sum-score(Ci,j , S) given for each summary type sum-type(Ci,j , S) with S ∈ {A,B} and
i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Error bars represent standard errors.
Table 5 Average summary scores sum-score(Ci,j , S) for each Story S ∈ {A,B} and for each
summary Ci,j with i, j ∈ {0, 1}, across the 4 similarity types sim-type(A,B). Number of responses
for each summary Ci,j and each story S are given in parentheses.
Similarity Average summary score sum-score(Ci,j , S)
type for Story S = A, S = B (number of responses)
sim-type(A,B) C11 C10 C01 C00
LS 4.39, 4.27 (142) 4.29, 4.15 (34) 3.97, 4.24 (38) 2.53, 2.51 (70)
ANA 3.43, 3.32 (135) 3.43, 2.63 (35) 2.93, 3.61 (28) 2.21, 2.31 (72)
SS 1.99, 1.93 (136) 4.27, 1.45 (33) 1.22, 4.06 (36) 1.25, 1.06 (67)
ANO 2.04, 2.01 (138) 2.69, 1.34 (35) 1.34, 2.66 (35) 0.96, 0.91 (68)
Overall 2.96, 2.89 (551) 3.68, 2.42 (137) 2.43, 3.67 (137) 1.74, 1.70 (277)
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Figure 2 Average summary scores sum-score(C11, A) and sum-score(C11, B) for the common
summary C11 for each of the 4 similarity types sim-type(A,B). Error bars represent standard errors.
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Table 6 Average similarity scores sim-score(A,B) distributed across the possible summary score
pairs sum-score(Ci,j , A) and sum-score(Ci,j , B), for all Ci,j with i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Similarity scores
above 2.50 are shown in bold and similarity scores above 3.00 are underlined.
su
m
-s
co
re
(C
i,
j
,B
) 5 1.33 2.09 2.71 3.00 4.22 4.72
4 2.06 2.55 3.38 3.39 3.74 4.22
3 1.43 1.60 2.75 2.93 3.76 3.38
2 1.88 1.91 2.98 2.81 2.78 3.89
1 1.31 2.52 1.85 1.71 2.06 1.44
0 1.87 1.36 1.00 1.29 2.00 1.88
0 1 2 3 4 5
sum-score(Ci,j , A)
Table 6 presents the average similarity scores sim-score(A,B) given by participants, for
each possible combination of scores sum-score(Ci,j , A) and sum-score(Ci,j , B) given for a
particular summary Ci,j . Interpreting the table as a graph, each cell of the table corresponds
to a point (x, y) in the graph, with coordinates the two summary scores sum-score(Ci,j , A)
and sum-score(Ci,j , B) given for a summary Ci,j . For example, to determine the value placed
in cell (0,0) (i.e., in the lower left corner of the graph), we gathered all the triples (A,B,Ci,j)
for all the summaries Ci,j scored with 0 for both stories A and B and we computed the
average similarity score sim-score(A,B) between stories A and B for these triples. Similarly,
the average similarity score sim-score(A,B) for all the summaries Ci,j scored with 1 for
their appropriateness for story A and with 0 for story B is presented in the cell (1, 0) of
the table, and so on. Observe that for triples where summaries Ci,j were rated with high
summary scores for both stories A and B (upper right corner of the graph), the average
sim-score(A,B) between stories A and B was higher. Hence, the existence of an appropriate
common summary for two stories suggests that the two stories are highly similar.
The data of Table 6 is also represented by the contour of Figure 3 (Left), where higher
average similarity scores are represented with warmer colors than lower average similarity
scores. Accordingly, the 3D curve of Figure 3 (Right) represents the two summary scores
(sum-score(Ci,j , A), sum-score(Ci,j , B)) by a point (x, y) in the horizontal plane, and the
average similarity score for each point (x, y) by the height z of the curve in the vertical
axis. Taken together, Table 6 and the two graphs of Figure 3, confirm our main hypothesis:
as the summary scores sum-score(Ci,j , A) and sum-score(Ci,j , B) increase, indicating that
the summary Ci,j becomes more and more appropriate for stories A and B, the average
similarity score sim-score(A,B) also increases.
Finally, we attempted to more systematically measure the appropriateness of a summary
Ci,j for both stories A and B simultaneously, with a single score. Using the two summary scores
sum-score(Ci,j , A) and sum-score(Ci,j , B), we estimated the appropriateness of summary
Ci,j as a common summary of A and B with 4 different computational methods: i) the sum
of scores, ii) the product of scores, iii) the Euclidean (L2) distance between scores and the
point (5,5), subtracted from the maximum distance between two points (which is 5
√
2), and
iv) the minimum of the two scores. The above functions were selected so that the higher the
values they produce, the more appropriate Ci,j would be as a common summary of stories A
and B. When graphing the relation between the average similarity score sim-score(A,B)
and the degree of Ci,j as a common summary, as computed using each of the above methods,
the relation was found to be directly proportional, and the two quantities extremely highly
correlated, confirming our main hypothesis once again (Figure 4).
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Figure 3 Average similarity scores sim-score(A,B) distributed across the possible summary
score pairs sum-score(Ci,j , A) and sum-score(Ci,j , B), for all Ci,j with i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Left: Contour
plot, where average similarity scores are represented by the colors of the spectrum; warmer colors
(red) indicate higher similarity scores, while colder colors (violet) indicate lower similarity scores.
Right: 3D plot, where average similarity scores are represented by the plot height (vertical axis).
5 Discussion
Taken together, the results of our study strongly confirmed our initial hypothesis: stories
that are both summarized by a single summary are similar to each other, and the more
appropriate this common summary is, the stronger the similarity of the stories becomes. The
common summary C11 was meant to be an appropriate summary for both stories A and
B, and we attempted to choose it to be so during the design of our experiment. However,
summary scores given to C11, regarding stories A, B of the SS and ANO similarity types,
were relatively low, indicating that this summary was not appropriate enough for the SS and
ANO pairs. Accordingly, it seems that we were unable to produce, even though we tried to,
an appropriate enough C11 summary for the story pairs of low similarity. This is directly
in line with our main hypothesis: dissimilar story pairs cannot have appropriate common
summaries.
Moreover, the participants’ ratings for similarity between the story pairs (A,B) were in
accordance with relevant previous work on similarity judgments for stories [9]. Gentner, et al.
designed several story pairs according to the similarity types of Table 1 and asked participants
to rate, among others, the subjective similarity of these pairs on a scale rating from 1 to
5. According to their results, story pairs of the LS type were considered as more similar
than those of the ANA type, and story pairs of the ANA type as more similar than those
of the SS type. In their study they did not use any story pairs of the ANO type. However,
given the definition of the Anomaly type as stories that share none of their predicates, we
could plausibly assume that story pairs of the ANO type would be rated with the lowest
degree of similarity among all types. Moreover, in Gentner et al. [9], the average similarity
ratings for the ANA type were close enough to the ratings for the LS type, while ratings for
the SS type were much lower. Our results on similarity judgments perfectly reproduced the
pattern found in previous work, indicating that the ordering of the similarity types reflects
the degree of relational overlap between the pairs.
However, in a previous attempt to empirically determine the factors that affect human
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Figure 4 Average similarity score sim-score(A,B) (y-axis) over the degree of appropriateness of
Ci,j as a common summary of A and B (x-axis), for each i, j ∈ {0, 1}. In each case the x-axis value was
calculated as a function F of the two summary scores sum-score(Ci,j , A) and sum-score(Ci,j , B). I:
FI(Ci,j , A,B) = sum-score(Ci,j , A)+sum-score(Ci,j , B) II: FII(Ci,j , A,B) = sum-score(Ci,j , A)×
sum-score(Ci,j , B) III: FIII(Ci,j , A,B) = 5
√
2− d[(sum-score(Ci,j , A), sum-score(Ci,j , B)), (5, 5)]
IV: FIV (Ci,j , A,B) = min[sum-score(Ci,j , A), sum-score(Ci,j , B)]
judgments on story comparison, Fisseni and Löwe [6] concluded that structural factors are
not the most important aspect for subjective similarity. This discrepancy with our and
Gentner et al.’s results may be due to the different methodology used. Fisseni and Löwe
asked participants to judge pairs of stories as same or different. In a second experiment,
participants were additionally asked to justify their sameness ratings by stating as many
differences between the stories as possible. This instruction, to explicitly state differences,
might have affected their responses. People tend to find more differences for highly similar
than for less similar pairs [8]. Since the story pairs used in that study were highly similar
(variants of the same story), participants may have reported many differences, even though
the stories were similar enough. Accordingly, this may have biased their sameness judgments.
Our empirically tested hypothesis comes from a previous work of Michael [19], as part
of a logic-based theoretical framework attempting to computationally define aspects of
story understanding. The formal definitions given therein offer qualitative metrics of the
appropriateness of a summary and the degree of similarity between two stories. A credulous
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common summary of two stories is defined as a summary that includes at least the most
important parts of the stories; and the existence of a credulous common summary is taken
to imply that the two stories are credulously similar in that they share at least their
most important parts. The present empirical study, other than to empirically support the
psychological validity of the hypothesis offered in that work, can also be seen to extend the
logic-based framework by defining some quantitative metrics for the ‘credulousness’ of a
common summary.
The standard distance metrics L1 = 10−FI , L2 = 5
√
2−FIII and L∞ = 5−FIV , based
on the functions FI , FIII , and FIV as previously defined (Figure 4), represent the distance
between the points (sum-score(Ci,j , A), sum-score(Ci,j , B)) and (5, 5). Considering that
the point (5, 5) represents the common summary that is the most appropriate for both stories
A and B (given that 5 is the maximum score for the score sum-score(Ci,j , S)), it follows
that the lower the value of these metrics, the closer the points are to the ‘most appropriate
common’ summary. Borrowing the notion of ‘credulousness’ of a summary [19], we could
name these quantities as “metrics of the credulousness of a common summary”.
Finally, we may say that our results reflect the two mapping principles of the SMT. The
fact that participants judged story pairs of the ANA type as more similar than those of the
SS type, indicates that people consider relational matches as more important than object
matches and also, in accordance to the systematicity principle of the SMT, that higher-order
relations count more than first-order relations for people’s judgments.
6 Conclusion
Identifying similarities among stories is a central part of the process of making sense of
stories, and building machines for the latter task will presumably require some solution to
the former. In this work we have provided overwhelming psychological evidence that the
more appropriate a given story is as a common summary of two other stories, the more
similar the latter two stories are to each other. The validity of this hypothesis offers a
sufficient condition to test for similarity, or more precisely, offers a way to lower bound the
degree of similarity. The condition is not, however, necessary, since the failure of a candidate
summary to be an appropriate common summary of two stories does not indicate lack of
similarity between the two stories, since some other candidate summary could exist that
would be appropriate. Devising a method to produce candidate summaries that would be
the most specific common summaries of two stories would offer the missing link to establish
the necessity of the condition as well. The role of expectations in stories [18, 19] would seem
to be important to that end.
The present study was a first step towards the confirmation of our hypothesis for a certain
sample of the possible types of stories. Further research could examine the applicability of
this hypothesis to other genres of stories. In a different direction, we could analyze stories
extracted automatically from online sources, in order to avoid manually selecting specific
types of stories, and any bias this choice may bring to the empirical study.
It would be interesting to generalize our hypothesis beyond stories, and to examine whether
similarity between two concepts is effectively equivalent to saying that the two concepts
share a common abstraction which is appropriate for both of them. Such concepts could
be short videos, simple images, or sound clips. We believe that the empirical methodology
developed herein, and the type of analysis performed, could be applied equally well to such
more general settings.
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